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赤峰翻譯公司關(guān)鍵字：impact of price competition. In this game, the telecom operators in the control of agencies trying to regulate prices under the market to competition.
From the theoretical analysis, we designed the original game model of telecom operators is the double game, join the game after the telecommunications regulatory model should be three-game model. Is shown in Table 4 shown in Table 3 in the aforementioned telecom price war game model based on the telecommunications regulatory authorities to join the game after the three models. A select line operators, operators B to select columns, select the matrix telecoms regulator, the "control" and "control" two strategies. If regulators choose "control" strategy, for taking "price" strategy to be punished operator B, for control are concerned, it is in its place their jobs, but also do not get no loss, because control of those proceeds are 0; for operators to take "price" strategy return value is subtracted on the basis of the original B, as shown in Table 4 in the matrix. If regulators choose "no control" strategy, for operators, revenue did not change compared to their original values, when the operators do not cut prices, regulators worry and effort to obtain a positive return for the S value; an operator cut prices, then regulators will be accused of failing due diligence to obtain the negative value of-D benefits, the two carriers cut prices, the value of the regulator's income-2D, as shown in Table 4 in the matrix B.As the matrix B,-D and-2D are the existence of this three-game model of Nash equilibrium solution depends on the parameters of which B. So that T = 7-B, R = 5, P = 4.5-B, S = 2.8, whichever is less of B, if: (1) T> R> P> S; (2) R> (T + S) / 2,, then (price, price, control) is the unique Nash equilibrium game model, telecom operators are still trapped in a "prisoner's dilemma", can not avoid owning household. When to take parameter B value gradually increases, so the above two conditions are no longer met, the (price, price, control) is no longer a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, when the parameter B is not the same, and sometimes (price, maintenance, control ) and (maintenance, price, control) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and sometimes there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, this time to avoid the vicious becomes likely.
In short, the telecommunications regulatory authorities to join the price war game possible to avoid vicious, provided that the telecommunications regulatory authorities to take "control" strategy, but also for the operators to cut prices to punish B must be large enough to be possible carriers out of the "prisoner's dilemma "and to avoid owning household.The use of game theory to analyze the price of Chinese telecom companies compete, you can get the following revelation: the revenue target of telecom operators in the price war into a
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