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駐馬店翻譯公司關(guān)鍵字：Into the 1990s, the "transition economy" countries appear privatization and corruption striking parallel growth trend, "corruption" of economics popular. On the one hand, Krueger and Bhagwati and other government interference and corruption on the close ties between the point of view to get a new experience in research support. Buchanan, Tullock (Turlock), Adams made a political deal with such theories (the government policy is a political market, political parties and officials and interest groups, voters with each other "transactions" power "game" balanced result, always appear not following the rules of the corrupt elements) and the government failure theory (officials are economic man, but also a personal cost-benefit calculation, the formation of rent-seeking motives), Stigler proposed control theory, there is the power of capital theory (once the public right to enter the market, will be transformed into capital, seizing the economic surplus, or the power business, set their own rent, their rent-seeking, or carrying over economic coercion, and levies, fines and fees, raising funds), are from a different perspective involved in this relationship; Aoki made a corrupt insider control theory is concerned about the state-owned enterprises in enterprises, especially the problem of corruption has occurred; Stiglitz, ink Aires, Spence, Akerlof , Vickery, and others from the widespread existence of principal - agent relationship between the perspective of corruption. On the other hand, sociology and political science and the relative position of the criticism of corruption, some economists from the privatization process of economic transition, the experience of the "corruption to improve the efficiency theory" or the so-called "productive rent-seeking" theory. If that low-income officials in bribes while providing public services (Tullock, 1996), in fact, Posner (1975) already proposed this idea: "Corruption can to some extent as a lubricant to enhance competition." Of course, this corruption of the "reasonableness" has been subject to criticism.Measures of corruption, mainly focused on how to reduce and limit public power (market competition mechanism is an effective limit), in the process of social transformation, people want to corruption (such as the purchase of public power) to promote privatization and market-oriented reforms, to reduce and limit public power. Fan Gang (1993) called "cheated out of a new system"; Zhang Shuguang (1993; 1994) that "reform should use corruption and bribery, in order to reduce barriers to the transfer of power and redistribution"; Steven Cheung (1995) " asset for privilege, and promote privatization. " And so on. But I think the market to competition in the market mechanism to establish a more extensive, it does mean that public rights are restricted, but it is not simply that public power is shrinking, while the main areas of activity of public power has shifted, from the economic sphere more towards social, political and cultural fields. Here's one of the most convincing evidence is, whether it is from my country's situation, or from the perspective of the development of modern developed countries, the state financial expenditure to GDP is not narrowing but widening. That is, the more modern society, the more the public interest, the higher the requirements for public power. So, I think, hope to reduce the public power to promote market-oriented and thus corruption is unrealistic, it is impossible to achieve the right balance of the public. In fact, China's corruption problem is precisely because of the reform, the power from the exit (decentralization), and from, the balance of power from the left failed to follow up the formation of the "power vacuum" (Zhuzheng Guo, 1994) for the breeding of corruption create the conditions. Therefore, control of corruption is not only a fundamental measure of system improvement general, we need to undertake system model of innovation, strengthen the system construction (Zhuzheng Guo, 1996), to establish a long-term constraints and incentives, opportunistic short-term control (Zhu Zhengguo, 1998). Zheng Liping (2000, 2002) from a broader background for the analysis of corruption, its distinction as the general corruption and systemic corruption, the former refers to people in economic assumptions and conditions of asymmetric information, in a given system of constraints their personal preferences under gains and losses calculated results. This calculation results with the system logically independent, and therefore general. Institutional corruption, dysfunctional public power is generated by corruption, this failure stems from irrational system. Moreover, he believes that in today's world from the corruption of the present situation, caused by the system, the impact of corruption on society more directly, more scale. Consequent, Fanfubaolian issue is a complex social system project, which requires a broader perspective, the need for broader and deeper reform and institution building.
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